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DEFINING “SPECIAL CARE” 
BEN GIFFORD* 
For the better part of the last century, the Supreme Court has held that 
courts must evaluate the voluntariness of juvenile confessions with “special 
care.”  This special care requirement cautions courts against judging 
juveniles “by the more exacting standards of maturity” or comparing a 
juvenile suspect “with an adult in full possession of his senses and 
knowledgeable of the consequences of his admissions.”  It also instructs 
courts to ensure that a juvenile’s “admission was voluntary, in the sense not 
only that it was not coerced or suggested, but also that it was not the product 
of ignorance of rights or of adolescent fantasy, fright or despair.” 
Despite the force with which the Supreme Court has spoken on the issue, 
lower courts regularly fail to follow the special care mandate.  Some 
overlook the standard altogether, while others only pay lip service to it, and 
still others misconstrue it and disregard it on mistaken grounds.  The result 
in any of these cases is that lower courts assess the voluntariness of juvenile 
confessions in the same way they would evaluate confessions obtained from 
adults, not with the heightened degree of scrutiny that Supreme Court 
precedent requires. 
In order to tether courts more firmly to the mast of special care, this 
Article highlights specific factors that courts should consider when 
evaluating the voluntariness of juvenile confessions.  By framing their 
analyses in terms of these factors, courts can hopefully begin to evaluate 
juvenile confessions with the requisite level of care. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Roughly one million juveniles are arrested in the United States each 
year.1  Many of these young individuals are interrogated by law enforcement 
officers, as are countless others who are subjected to questioning without 
formal arrest.2  Unless specifically requested by the juvenile, most states do 
not require the presence of a parent, lawyer, or other interested adult during 
the interrogation.3 
Unsurprisingly, juvenile interrogations raise a number of pressing 
concerns.  Not only are youths less capable than adults of understanding and 
exercising their constitutional rights,4 but they are also uniquely susceptible 
to “the inherent pressures of the interrogation atmosphere.”5  Coupled with 
the fact that interrogators often fail to tailor their techniques to account for 
the age of their suspect,6 this susceptibility gives rise to a heightened risk of 
involuntary confessions in children.7  The younger the child, the greater the 
risk.8 
 
 1 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, 
STATISTICAL BRIEFING BOOK: JUVENILE ARRESTS (Oct. 22, 2018), https://www.ojjdp.gov/ojs
tatbb/crime/qa05101.asp [perma.cc/7KKC-ESYX] [hereinafter OJJDP, JUVENILE ARRESTS]. 
 2 STUDY: FEW JUVENILE SUSPECTS EXERCISE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS DURING 
INTERROGATIONS, AM. PSYCHOL. ASS’N (Aug. 8, 2014), http://www.apa.org/news/press/
releases/2014/08/juvenile-suspects.aspx [perma.cc/32ST-KEXD]. 
 3 Joanna S. Markman, In re Gault: A Retrospective in 2007: Is It Working? Can It Work?, 
9 BARRY L. REV. 123, 133 (2007). 
 4 See infra notes 75–76 and accompanying text. 
 5 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 468 (1966); see infra Section I.C. 
 6 Barry C. Feld, Police Interrogation of Juveniles: An Empirical Study of Policy and 
Practice, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 219, 222 (2006) (“Interrogation manuals recommend 
that police use the same techniques with children as with adults, despite developmental 
psychologists’ doubts that juveniles possess the cognitive ability or judgment necessary to 
function on par with adults.”). 
 7 See infra Section I.C. 
 8 See infra notes 84–86 and accompanying text. 
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Recognizing the heightened risk inherent in juvenile confessions, the 
Supreme Court has long held that courts must evaluate the voluntariness of 
these confessions with “special care” before admitting them in evidence.9  
The special care standard cautions courts against judging juveniles “by the 
more exacting standards of maturity”10 or comparing a juvenile suspect “with 
an adult in full possession of his senses and knowledgeable of the 
consequences of his admissions.”11  It also instructs courts to ensure that a 
juvenile’s “admission was voluntary, in the sense not only that it was not 
coerced or suggested, but also that it was not the product of ignorance of 
rights or of adolescent fantasy, fright or despair.”12 
Despite the force with which the Supreme Court has spoken on the 
topic, lower courts regularly fail to adhere to the special care mandate.13  
Some overlook the standard altogether,14 while others only pay lip service to 
it,15 and still others misconstrue and incorrectly disregard it.16  The result in 
any of these scenarios is that lower courts assess the voluntariness of juvenile 
confessions in the same way that they would evaluate confessions obtained 
from adults, instead of applying the heightened degree of scrutiny that 
Supreme Court precedent requires. 
In order to tether courts more firmly to the mast of special care, this 
Article highlights specific factors that courts should consider when 
evaluating the voluntariness of juvenile confessions.  Part I begins by 
providing a brief overview of the Supreme Court’s voluntariness 
jurisprudence, before exploring both the history and importance of the 
special care requirement.  Part II then highlights various ways in which lower 
courts have misapplied the special care standard, which range from ignoring 
it to misconstruing it.  Part III concludes by offering a definition of special 
care that centers around interrogation tactics that are particularly likely to 
cause involuntary confessions in juveniles.  By framing their analyses in 
terms of these tactics, courts can hopefully begin to evaluate juvenile 
confessions with the requisite level of care. 
 
 9 Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 53 (1962) (quoting Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 599 
(1948) (plurality opinion)). 
 10 Haley, 332 U.S. at 599 (plurality opinion). 
 11 Gallegos, 370 U.S. at 54. 
 12 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 55 (1967). 
 13 See infra Part II. 
 14 See infra Section II.A. 
 15 See infra Section II.B. 
 16 See infra Section II.C. 
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I. THE “SPECIAL CARE” REQUIREMENT 
A. A BRIEF HISTORY OF VOLUNTARINESS 
For over a century, the Supreme Court has made clear that involuntary 
confessions are inadmissible as evidence against the accused.  As early as 
1884, the Court stated that “a confession made to one authority should not go 
to the jury unless it appears to the court to have been voluntary.”17  Fifteen 
years later, the Court issued several decisions in which it reaffirmed that “a 
confession, in order to be admissible, must be free and voluntary.”18  In these 
early cases, the Court understood itself to be continuing a tradition that had 
long been established at common law.19  Its decisions were motivated in large 
part by concerns about the reliability of involuntary confessions: 
A confession, if freely and voluntarily made, is evidence of the most satisfactory 
character . . . . But the presumption upon which weight is given to such evidence . . . 
ceases when the confession appears to have been made either in consequence of 
inducements of a temporal nature . . . or because of a threat or promise . . . which, 
operating upon the fears or hopes of the accused, . . . deprives him of that freedom of 
will or self-control essential to make his confession voluntary within the meaning of 
the law.20 
At the same time that the Court was situating its voluntariness analysis 
within common law traditions, it was also framing its inquiry in terms of 
constitutional rules.  In 1897, the Court wrote in Bram v. United States21 that 
for federal criminal cases, “where-ever a question arises whether a confession 
is incompetent because not voluntary, the issue is controlled by that portion 
of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, 
commanding that no person ‘shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a 
witness against himself.’”22  Forty years later, in Brown v. Mississippi,23 the 
 
 17 Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 587 (1884). 
 18 Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542 (1897) (quoting 3 WILLIAM OLDNALL 
RUSSELL, RUSSELL ON CRIMES 478 (Horace Smith and A. P. P. Keep eds., 6th ed. 1896)); see 
also Wilson v. United States, 162 U.S. 613, 621–22 (1896); Pierce v. United States, 160 U.S. 
355, 357 (1896); Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 55 (1895). 
 19 Bram, 168 U.S. at 545–46 (first quoting 1 LORD HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF 
THE CROWN 304 (1st ed. 1736), for the proposition that “the confession before one of the privy 
council or a justice of the peace being voluntarily made, without torture, is sufficient as to the 
indictment on trial” in cases of treason; and then quoting LORD GILBERT, THE LAW OF 
EVIDENCE 139 (2d ed. 1760), for the proposition that a “confession must be voluntary, and 
without compulsion”). 
 20 Hopt, 110 U.S. at 584–85 (citations omitted). 
 21 168 U.S. 532. 
 22 Id. at 542; see U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 23 297 U.S. 278 (1936). 
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Court held that involuntary confessions are similarly barred from admission 
in state courts by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.24 
In the decades following Brown, the Court fleshed out the contours of 
its voluntariness analysis.  Its decisions echoed earlier cases’ worries about 
the reliability of involuntary confessions,25 but they also evinced less 
pragmatic concerns about the moral impropriety of abusive interrogation 
practices.26  Most of the Court’s voluntariness cases during this period were 
state court cases analyzed through the lens of the Due Process Clause,27 and 
although the Court eventually incorporated the Fifth Amendment privilege 
against the states,28 the two constitutional provisions have been interpreted 
to impose the same test29: for state and federal cases alike, a confession is 
admissible only if it is voluntary under “the totality of the circumstances.”30 
In guiding lower courts’ evaluation of the totality of the circumstances, 
the Supreme Court has highlighted several issues to consider.  Courts must 
first make a threshold finding of interrogator coercion before holding a 
confession involuntary,31 and they then should review factors like “the length 
of the interrogation; its location; its continuity; the defendant’s maturity; 
education; physical condition; and mental health.”32  Although the Supreme 
Court has “suggested that the use of physical violence or threats of physical 
violence or both are per se impermissible,”33 it has also made clear that 
 
 24 Id. at 287; see U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 25 See, e.g., Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 207 (1960). 
 26 See, e.g., Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 320–21 (1959); see also Eve Brensike 
Primus, The Future of Confession Law: Toward Rules for the Voluntariness Test, 114 MICH. 
L. REV. 1, 9 (2015) (“[H]istorically and as a matter of current practice there are two strands of 
voluntariness analysis—one deontological and one consequentialist. The deontological branch 
is concerned with action that is bad in and of itself regardless of its effect on the suspect . . . . 
The consequentialist branch concerns police action that is bad because of its tendency to 
produce unreliable confessions . . . .”). 
 27 2 JOSHUA DRESSLER ET AL., UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: VOLUME 1: 
INVESTIGATION 421 (7th ed. 2017). 
 28 Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964). 
 29 See DRESSLER ET AL., supra note 27, at 421–22. 
 30 Although the Court had previously alluded to the importance of individualized 
circumstances in evaluating a confession’s voluntariness, see, e.g., Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 
574, 583 (1884) (“The admissibility of such evidence so largely depends upon the special 
circumstances connected with the confession, that it is difficult, if not impossible, to formulate 
a rule that will comprehend all cases.”); Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 404 (1945) (“If 
all the attendant circumstances indicate that the confession was coerced or compelled, it may 
not be used to convict a defendant.”), the first reference to the “totality of the circumstances” 
appears in Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191, 197 (1957). 
 31 Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 163–64 (1986). 
 32 Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 693 (1993) (citations omitted). 
 33 Primus, supra note 26, at 26. 
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“coercion can be mental as well as physical, and that the blood of the accused 
is not the only hallmark of an unconstitutional inquisition.”34  Furthermore, 
the Court has held that the voluntariness of a confession is a legal question,35 
whose resolution depends on a subjective inquiry into “whether a defendant’s 
will was overborne in a particular case.”36 
In addition to governing the voluntariness of a defendant’s confession 
itself, the totality-of-the-circumstances test governs the voluntariness of a 
defendant’s waiver of rights under Miranda v. Arizona.37  Although Miranda 
“drastically changed the landscape of confession suppression jurisprudence 
and shifted much of the courts’, litigants’, and commentators’ attention from 
the due process issue of involuntariness to issues concerning the application 
and waiver of Miranda rights,”38 due process challenges “remain[] a vital and 
perplexing feature of the criminal justice system in the United States when 
considering the admissibility of confessions.”39  As a result, courts will often 
review the voluntariness of a defendant’s initial Miranda waiver in light of 
the totality of the circumstances, before separately evaluating the 
voluntariness of the subsequent confession under the same standard.40 
B. THE SPECIAL CARE STANDARD 
At the same time that the Court was fleshing out its general 
voluntariness test, it was also articulating specific standards regarding the 
 
 34 Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 206 (1960). 
 35 Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 115 (1985). 
 36 Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973); see Miller, 474 U.S. at 116 
(“[T]he admissibility of a confession turns . . . on whether the techniques for extracting the 
statements, as applied to this suspect, are compatible with a system that presumes innocence 
and assures that a conviction will not be secured by inquisitorial means . . . .”). 
 37 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (holding that a suspect in custodial interrogation must be 
advised of various rights—including his right to remain silent and his right to an attorney—
and that the suspect must “voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently” waive those rights in order 
for any subsequent confession to be admissible); see Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 
(1986) (“Only if the totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation reveal both an 
uncoerced choice and the requisite level of comprehension may a court properly conclude that 
the Miranda rights have been waived.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 38 Martin Guggenheim & Randy Hertz, J.D.B. and the Maturing of Juvenile Confession 
Suppression Law, 38 WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 109, 120 (2012). 
 39 Paul Marcus, It’s Not Just About Miranda: Determining the Voluntariness of 
Confessions in Criminal Prosecutions, 40 VAL. U. L. REV. 601, 642 (2006) (“Miranda applies 
to many cases and disposes of a good number of them. However, literally thousands of 
prosecutions can be found throughout the country where serious due process challenges are 
raised so that the government has to offer substantial evidence to rebut the claim of 
constitutional violations.”). 
 40 See, e.g., State v. Goodwin, 774 N.W.2d 733 (Neb. 2009); infra text accompanying 
notes 120–123. 
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confessions of juvenile suspects.  In Haley v. Ohio,41 the Court considered 
the case of John Harvey Haley, a fifteen-year-old boy who was convicted of 
first-degree murder for acting as a lookout during a deadly robbery.42  Five 
days after the crime took place, Haley was arrested at his home around 
midnight, brought to a police station, and held in isolation.43 He was 
interrogated for several hours by a series of police officers, who “questioned 
him in relays of one or two each.”44  Finally, at five o’clock in the morning, 
Haley confessed after the officers showed him alleged confessions of the 
other two boys suspected of participating in the crime.45 
At trial, Haley argued that his confession had been obtained through 
duress, and he objected to its admission in evidence.46  The judge 
nevertheless submitted the question of voluntariness to the jury, which found 
against Haley and convicted him.47  The intermediate appellate court 
affirmed with minimal elaboration on the question of voluntariness,48 as did 
the state high court, which dismissed Haley’s appeal “for the reason that no 
debatable constitutional question is involved.”49 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed.50  Writing for a 
plurality, Justice Douglas began by recounting the details of Haley’s case, 
before concluding, “We do not think the methods used in obtaining this 
confession can be squared with that due process of law which the Fourteenth 
Amendment commands.”51  Although Justice Douglas declined to answer 
whether the interrogators’ tactics would have been permissible “if a mature 
man were involved,” he explained that: 
[W]hen, as here, a mere child — an easy victim of the law — is before us, special care 
in scrutinizing the record must be used. Age 15 is a tender and difficult age for a boy 
of any race. He cannot be judged by the more exacting standards of maturity. That 
 
 41 332 U.S. 596 (1948). 
 42 Id. at 597–98 (plurality opinion). 
 43 Id. at 598. 
 44 Id. 
 45 Id. There was also some evidence that Haley had been beaten by the police, but the 
Court held this evidence to the side for purposes of deciding whether Haley’s confession was 
voluntary. Id. at 597–98. 
 46 Id. at 599. 
 47 Id. 
 48 State v. Lowder, 72 N.E.2d 785, 788 (Ohio Ct. App. 1946). 
 49 State v. Haley, 70 N.E.2d 905, 905 (Ohio 1947). 
 50 Haley, 332 U.S. at 601 (plurality opinion); id. at 607 (Frankfurter, J., joining in reversal 
of judgment). 
 51 Id. at 599 (plurality opinion). 
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which would leave a man cold and unimpressed can overawe and overwhelm a lad in 
his early teens.52 
This special care standard, which requires that juvenile confessions 
receive heightened scrutiny, has been repeated and reaffirmed in the Court’s 
subsequent decisions.  Over a decade after Haley, in Gallegos v. Colorado53 
the Court reviewed the murder conviction of Robert Gallegos, who was 
fourteen years old when he robbed and assaulted an elderly man who later 
died from his injuries.54  Gallegos was arrested two weeks after the incident 
(while the victim was still alive), and he immediately admitted to the 
crimes.55  He was then held in isolation for five days, after which he signed 
a confession that formed the basis of his subsequent conviction.56 
As in Haley, the state courts held that Gallegos’s confession was 
voluntary and admissible,57 and as in Haley, the Supreme Court reversed.58 
Now writing for a majority, Justice Douglas emphasized that a suspect’s 
youth is a “crucial factor” in assessing the voluntariness of a confession, and 
he quoted at length from his opinion in Haley.59  While the government 
contended that Gallegos “was advised of his right to counsel, but . . . did not 
ask either for a lawyer or for his parents,” the Court responded that “a 14-
year-old boy, no matter how sophisticated, is unlikely to have any conception 
of what will confront him when he is made accessible only to the police.”60  
Moreover, the Court explained, a child “cannot be compared with an adult in 
full possession of his senses and knowledgeable of the consequences of his 
admissions.”61  The Court even went so far as to suggest that, “[w]ithout 
some adult protection against this inequality, a 14-year-old boy would not be 
able to know, let alone assert, such constitutional rights as he had.”62 
Although the Court has not insisted on this suggestion that juvenile 
confessions require adult protection,63 it has continued to reiterate the prized 
place that children occupy in its voluntariness jurisprudence.  Not long after 
Gallegos, the Court held in In re Gault64 that the privilege against self-
 
 52 Id. (emphasis added). 
 53 370 U.S. 49 (1962). 
 54 See Gallegos v. People, 358 P.2d 1028, 1030 (Colo. 1960) (en banc). 
 55 Gallegos, 370 U.S. at 49–50. 
 56 Id. at 50. 
 57 Gallegos, 358 P.2d at 1034. 
 58 Gallegos, 370 U.S. at 55. 
 59 Id. at 53. 
 60 Id. at 54. 
 61 Id. 
 62 Id. 
 63 See, e.g., Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 727 (1979). 
 64 387 U.S. 1 (1967). 
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incrimination and other constitutional protections must be extended to 
juveniles in delinquency proceedings.65  Again quoting extensively from 
Haley, the Court “emphasized that admissions and confessions of juveniles 
require special caution,”66 and it noted “that the ‘distrust of confessions made 
in certain situations’ . . . is imperative in the case of children from an early 
age through adolescence.”67  Even if “counsel was not present for some 
permissible reason when an admission was obtained,” the Court wrote, “the 
greatest care must be taken to assure that the admission was voluntary, in the 
sense not only that it was not coerced or suggested, but also that it was not 
the product of ignorance of rights or of adolescent fantasy, fright or 
despair.”68 
The Court changed course somewhat in Fare v. Michael C.,69 in which 
it held that a juvenile defendant had voluntarily waived his Miranda rights, 
notwithstanding the fact that he had requested and been denied the 
opportunity to speak with his probation officer.70  But even in Fare, the Court 
made clear that “special concerns . . . are present when young persons, often 
with limited experience and education and with immature judgment, are 
involved.”71  The Court also cautioned that juvenile voluntariness 
assessments “mandate[] . . . evaluation of the juvenile’s age, experience, 
education, background, and intelligence, and into whether he has the capacity 
to understand the warnings given him, the nature of his . . . rights, and the 
consequences of waiving those rights.”72 
Finally, the Court recently reaffirmed its commitment to the special care 
standard in J.D.B. v. North Carolina,73 in which it held “that a child’s age 
properly informs the Miranda custody analysis.”74  Drawing on cases from a 
range of areas, the Court explained “that children ‘generally are less mature 
and responsible than adults,’ . . . that they ‘often lack the experience, 
perspective, and judgment to recognize and avoid choices that could be 
detrimental to them,’ . . . [and] that they ‘are more vulnerable or susceptible 
 
 65 Id. at 30–31. 
 66 Id. at 45. 
 67 Id. at 48 (quoting 3 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, WIGMORE’S CODE OF THE RULES OF 
EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT LAW § 822 (3d ed. 1940)); see also id. at 52 (“[A]uthoritative opinion 
has cast formidable doubt upon the reliability and trustworthiness of ‘confessions’ by 
children.”). 
 68 Id. at 55. 
 69 442 U.S. 707 (1979). 
 70 Id. at 727. 
 71 Id. at 725. 
 72 Id. 
 73 564 U.S. 261 (2011). 
 74 Id. at 265. 
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to . . . outside pressures’ than adults.”75  Even the dissent, written by Justice 
Alito, took for granted that “the Court’s precedents . . . make clear that 
‘special care’ must be exercised in applying the voluntariness test where the 
confession of a ‘mere child’ is at issue.”76 
C. THE IMPORTANCE OF SPECIAL CARE 
Taken together, the cases above stand for the proposition that juveniles 
are more vulnerable than adults, and that courts should hesitate longer before 
holding their confessions to be voluntary.  This proposition is not just the 
product of armchair psychology, moreover, but is supported by a rich body 
of empirical scholarship. 
As the Court recognized in J.D.B., a wealth of social science research 
indicates that juveniles are uniquely susceptible to the pressures of 
interrogation.77  Unsurprisingly, juveniles are much less likely than adults to 
understand78 or exercise79 their Miranda rights.  Juveniles also exhibit 
numerous developmental differences from adults—including in “their 
cognitive abilities to encode, store, and retrieve memories,” their proclivity 
“to mak[e] source misattributions,” and their “forgetting, retention, and 
relearning curves”80—that jeopardize the reliability of their statements. 
In addition, juveniles are significantly less “future oriented” than adults, 
both in terms of their ability to anticipate the consequences of their actions 
and in terms of their preference for smaller rewards now over larger rewards 
 
 75 Id. at 272 (citations omitted) (first quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115–
16 (1982); then quoting Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 635 (1979) (plurality opinion); and 
then quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005)). 
 76 Id. at 297 (Alito, J., dissenting) (quoting Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 599 (1948) 
(plurality opinion)). 
 77 See id. at 269 (majority opinion) (citing Brief for Center on Wrongful Convictions of 
Youth, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 21–22, J.D.B., 564 U.S. 261 (No. 09-
11121)); id. at 273 n.5 (citing Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68 (2010)). 
 78 Thomas Grisso, Juveniles’ Capacities to Waive Miranda Rights: An Empirical Analysis, 
68 CALIF. L. REV. 1134, 1157, 1155 tbl.4 (1980) (finding that “juveniles younger than fifteen 
manifest significantly poorer comprehension [of their Miranda rights] than adults of 
comparable intelligence” and that most juveniles misunderstood at least some of the Miranda 
warning statements). 
 79 J. Thomas Grisso & Carolyn Pomicter, Interrogation of Juveniles: An Empirical Study 
of Procedures, Safeguards, and Rights Waiver, 1 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 321, 339 (1977) (finding 
that only about 10% of juveniles refused to waive their rights during interrogation, as 
compared with 40% of adults). 
 80 Jessica Owen-Kostelnik et al., Testimony & Interrogation of Minors: Assumptions 
about Maturity and Morality, 61 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 286, 292 (2006). 
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later.81  This lack of future orientation creates a heightened risk that a juvenile 
will “falsely confess out of a desire to return home, believing that his 
innocence will be straightened out later.”82  And that risk is compounded by 
the fact that juveniles “are less capable of withstanding interpersonal stress 
and thus more likely to perceive aversive interrogation as intolerable.”83 
Finally, juveniles are “more suggestible if they are questioned by 
authority figures such as police, and if they believe that the interrogators are 
already knowledgeable about the subject of the interview.”84  Myriad studies 
have explored interviewers’ ability to shape juveniles’ responses.85  Some of 
these studies suggest that interrogators can use positive and negative 
reinforcement to elicit responses from juveniles that are not only false, but 
also absurd.86 
Juveniles’ heightened susceptibility is not confined to the laboratory 
setting.  To the contrary, research suggests that juvenile false confessions 
have been a major source of wrongful convictions over the past few decades.  
According to the National Registry of Exonerations, which “collects, 
analyzes and disseminates information about all known exonerations of 
innocent criminal defendants in the United States, from 1989 to the 
present,”87 roughly 12% of exonerated defendants of all ages confessed to 
crimes that they did not commit.88  When only juvenile exonerees are 
considered, the percentage who falsely confessed jumps to 36%, and when 
those under age fourteen are separated out, it jumps again to 86%.89 
 
 81 Laurence Steinberg et al., Age Differences in Future Orientation and Delay 
Discounting, 80 CHILD DEV. 28, 39 (2009). 
 82 INT’L ASS’N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, REDUCING RISKS: AN EXECUTIVE’S GUIDE TO 
EFFECTIVE JUVENILE INTERVIEW AND INTERROGATION 9 (2012), https://www.theiacp.org/
sites/default/files/all/p-r/ReducingRisksAnExecutiveGuidetoEffectiveJuvenileInterviewand
Interrogation.pdf [perma.cc/73MP-9Z4V]. 
 83 RICHARD A. LEO, POLICE INTERROGATION AND AMERICAN JUSTICE 233–34 (2008). 
 84 F. James Billings et al., Can Reinforcement Induce Children to Falsely Incriminate 
Themselves?, 31 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 125, 126 (2007) (citations omitted). 
 85 See id. (canvassing studies). 
 86 See, e.g., Sena Garven et al., Allegations of Wrongdoing: The Effects of Reinforcement 
on Children’s Mundane and Fantastic Claims, 85 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 38, 42–43 (2000) 
(finding that, when subjected to positive and negative reinforcement, a majority of five to 
seven-year-olds agreed to a number of fantastical suggestions, including that they had been 
taken to a farm on a helicopter, were shown animals there, and were allowed to ride a horse). 
 87 Our Mission, NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, http://www.law.umich.edu/special/
exoneration/Pages/mission.aspx [perma.cc/J97E-KJK7]. 
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These statistics, moreover, radically understate the total number of 
juvenile false confessions that take place in the United States.  First, the 
Registry data includes only individuals who were convicted of their crimes, 
and most false confessions do not result in a conviction.90  Second, the data 
includes only individuals who were exonerated, and exoneration is incredibly 
difficult to achieve, particularly for defendants who have confessed to the 
crimes of which they are accused.91  When one considers that roughly one 
million juveniles are arrested each year,92 the total number of juvenile false 
confessions becomes potentially dramatic. 
II. MISAPPLYING THE STANDARD 
The Supreme Court has made clear that juvenile interrogations need to 
be evaluated with special care.  And the research just discussed resoundingly 
confirms that need, particularly in light of juveniles’ developmental deficits 
and disproportionate tendency to make false confessions.  In recent decades, 
however, courts have failed “to take into account the unique vulnerability of 
children on a case-by-case basis.”93  Instead, research indicates that courts 
have “exclude[d] only the most egregiously obtained confessions and then 
only haphazardly.”94  The resulting state of affairs is one in which lower 
courts “have largely abdicated their responsibility to review a juvenile’s 
waiver of rights during custodial interrogation with the ‘special caution’ 
required by due process.”95 
 
 90 See Steven A. Drizin & Richard A. Leo, The Problem of False Confessions in the Post-
DNA World, 82 N.C. L. REV. 891, 900 (2004); Samuel Gross & Maurice Possley, For 50 
Years, You’ve Had “The Right to Remain Silent”, MARSHALL PROJECT (June 12, 2006, 10:00 
PM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2016/06/12/for-50-years-you-ve-had-the-right-to-
remain-silent [perma.cc/9Z2S-GFLT]. 
 91 Gross & Possley, supra note 90. 
 92 See OJJDP, JUVENILE ARRESTS, supra note 1. 
 93 Steven A. Drizin, The Lee Arthur Hester Case and the Unfinished Business of the 
United States Supreme Court to Protect Juveniles During Police Interrogations, 6 NW. J. L. 
& SOC. POL’Y 358, 398 (2011) [hereinafter The Lee Arthur Hester Case]; Steven A. Drizin & 
Beth A. Colgan, Tales from the Juvenile Confession Front: A Guide to How Standard Police 
Interrogation Tactics Can Produce Coerced and False Confessions from Juvenile Suspects, 
in INTERROGATIONS, CONFESSIONS, AND ENTRAPMENT 127, 130 (G. Daniel Lassiter ed., 2004) 
(“[T]here are legions of cases in which judges have ignored or paid lip service to the unique 
vulnerabilities of children in the interrogation process . . . .”). 
 94 BARRY C. FELD, BAD KIDS: RACE AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE JUVENILE COURT 
118 (1999); see Guggenheim & Hertz, supra note 38, at 161 (“[T]he lower courts have applied 
the doctrine in a haphazard manner, usually rejecting involuntariness claims in all but the most 
extreme sets of circumstances.”). 
 95 Kenneth J. King, Waiving Childhood Goodbye: How Juvenile Courts Fail to Protect 
Children from Unknowing, Unintelligent, and Involuntary Waivers of Miranda Rights, 2006 
WIS. L. REV. 431, 434; see Kevin Lapp, Taking Back Juvenile Confessions, 64 UCLA L. REV. 
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In order to better understand lower courts’ failures, this Part explores 
some of the most common ways in which these courts misapply the special 
care standard.  The discussion below is not meant to be exhaustive, but it is 
instead intended to provide a framework for analyzing opinions and 
arguments that stray from established Supreme Court precedent.  This Part is 
also not meant to imply that courts fail to apply special care whenever they 
hold that a juvenile confession is voluntary.  To the contrary, many courts 
have held juvenile confessions to be voluntary without succumbing to the 
pitfalls described below,96 and Part III offers lower courts guidance that will 
help them apply the special care standard even if they ultimately admit the 
confessions under review.  Where courts have committed the errors discussed 
in this Part, however, their decisions should not be upheld. 
A. FAILURE TO ACKNOWLEDGE 
One of the most common ways in which lower courts misapply the 
special care standard is by failing to acknowledge the standard at all.  Instead, 
these courts evaluate the voluntariness of juvenile confessions through the 
lens of the generic totality-of-the-circumstances test, without any indication 
that juvenile confessions raise unique concerns or require a different inquiry.  
The resulting analyses are identical to those that the courts would have 
conducted if they were evaluating confessions extracted from mature adults. 
Although an exhaustive accounting of such opinions would be 
unwieldy, the following examples are illustrative of broader trends in the case 
 
902, 927 (2017) (“[S]pecial solicitude for juvenile suspects . . . has faded from modern 
jurisprudence.”). 
 96 See, e.g., In re Luis P., 74 N.Y.S.3d 221, 230–33 (N.Y. App. Div. 2018); People v. 
Murdock, 979 N.E.2d 74, 81–90 (Ill. 2012); Rodriguez v. Com., 578 S.E.2d 78, 83–87 (Va. 
Ct. App. 2003); State v. Presha, 748 A.2d 1108, 1113–18 (N.J. 2000). 
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law.97 In Vega v. State,98 the Court of Appeals of Texas reviewed the capital 
murder conviction of Marie Lisette Garcia Vega, who was sentenced to life 
in prison for crimes committed at sixteen years old.99  Shortly after her arrest, 
Vega gave inculpatory statements to police officers, and the trial court denied 
her motion to suppress.100  After several rounds of appeals,101 the court held 
that Vega’s confession had been properly admitted.102  In evaluating the 
voluntariness of Vega’s confession, the court made no reference to the 
heightened standard that applies to juveniles.103  Instead, the court stated only 
that it was required to “examine the totality of the circumstances surrounding 
the interrogation to determine if a confession was voluntary and 
uncoerced.”104  After reciting the facts of Vega’s interrogation, the court 
concluded that the totality-of-the-circumstances standard had been satisfied, 
again without mentioning Vega’s age.105 
Even more striking than Vega is Hamwright v. State,106 in which the 
Court of Special Appeals of Maryland upheld the trial court’s determination 
that the defendant’s confession to carjacking and robbery had been 
voluntary.107  Notwithstanding the defendant’s undisputed contention that he 
 
 97 See, e.g., Dixon v. State, 588 So. 2d 903, 907–08 (Ala. 1991); J.W. v. State, 751 So. 2d 
529, 532–33 (Ala. Crim. App. 1999); Surles v. State, 610 So. 2d 1254, 1255 (Ala. Crim. App. 
1992); Rimpel v. State, 607 So. 2d 502, 503 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992); Martin v. State, 568 
S.E.2d 754, 757–58 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002); S.G. v. State, 956 N.E.2d 668, 680–81 (Ind. Ct. App. 
2011); Matter of Welfare of L.R.B., 373 N.W.2d 334, 337–38 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985); Morgan 
v. State, 681 So. 2d 82, 86–89 (Miss. 1996); State v. Clements, 789 S.W.2d 101, 105–07 (Mo. 
Ct. App. 1990); In re R.L.H., 116 P.3d 791, 798 (Mont. 2005); In re C.L., 87 P.3d 462, 465 
(Mont. 2004); Matter of R. P. S., 623 P.2d 964, 969 (Mont. 1981); State v. Gaines, 483 S.E.2d 
396, 406 (N.C. 1997); In re M.D., No. CA2003–12–038, 2004 WL 2505161, at *5–7 (Ohio 
Ct. App. Nov. 8, 2004); In Interest of Christopher W., 329 S.E.2d 769, 770 (S.C. Ct. App. 
1985); State v. Watkins, No. 01C01-9701-CC-00004, 1997 WL 766462, at *8 (Tenn. Crim. 
App. Dec. 12, 1997); Meadoux v. State, 307 S.W.3d 401, 412–13 (Tex. App. 2009), aff’d, 325 
S.W.3d 189 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); In re J.A.B., 281 S.W.3d 62, 66 (Tex. App. 2008); 
Matthews v. State, 677 S.W.2d 282, 283 (Tex. App. 1984); In Interest of T.S.V., 607 P.2d 
827, 828 (Utah 1980); State v. S.S., No. 55403–4–I, 2006 WL 1462784, at *2–3 (Wash. Ct. 
App. May 30, 2006). 
 98 255 S.W.3d 87 (Tex. App. 2007). 
 99 Id. at 90. 
 100 Id. 
 101 See Vega v. State, 32 S.W.3d 897 (Tex. App. 2000); Vega v. State, 84 S.W.3d 613 
(Tex. Crim. App. 2002). 
 102 Vega, 255 S.W.3d at 97–101. 
 103 Id. at 97–99. 
 104 Id. at 97 (citation omitted). 
 105 Id. at 99. 
 106 787 A.2d 824 (Md. App. 2001). 
 107 Id. at 838. 
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was “fifteen years old and had a learning disability” and that he “was kept, 
chained and incommunicado, in an interrogation room from about 3 p.m. 
until about 1 a.m.,”108 the court concluded with little analysis that it was not 
error to deny his motion to suppress.109  In evaluating the defendant’s 
argument that his confession was involuntary, the Hamwright court—like the 
Vega court—said only that it was required to “analyze the facts by 
considering the totality of the circumstances,” and it added that “[t]he same 
is true even for a juvenile.”110  Its brief analysis made no other reference to 
the defendant’s age.111 
As a final example, in State v. Gutierrez,112 the Supreme Court of New 
Mexico reviewed a sixteen-year-old defendant’s conviction for murder and 
other charges.113  The defendant confessed to the crimes after an aggressive 
interrogation in which the detective implied that a confession would lead to 
more lenient treatment.114  The court nevertheless held that the confession 
was voluntary and that the district court had properly denied the defendant’s 
motion to suppress.115  In citing the relevant U.S. Supreme Court cases that 
guided its voluntariness analysis, the court made no mention of the special 
care requirement, and it referenced the defendant’s age only as one factor of 
many in the totality-of-the-circumstances test.116  When it came time to apply 
this legal standard, the court’s evaluation of the defendant’s age consisted 
entirely of citations to prior cases in which it had stated that defendants even 
younger than Gutierrez were capable of giving voluntary confessions.117 
B. ACKNOWLEDGING WITHOUT APPLYING 
Even where courts acknowledge the heightened standard that governs 
juvenile confessions, they often fail to apply it in any meaningful way.  The 
resulting analyses in these cases are no different than those in the cases above 
or in cases involving adult suspects. 
 
 108 Id. at 836. 
 109 Id. at 838. 
 110 Id. 
 111 Id. 
 112 258 P.3d 1024 (N.M. 2011). 
 113 Id. at 1030. 
 114 Id. at 1036. 
 115 Id. at 1037. 
 116 See id. at 1035 (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973)). 
 117 Id. at 1037 (citing State v. Martinez, 979 P.2d 718 (N.M. 1999); State v. Jonathan M., 
791 P.2d 64 (N.M. 1990)). Ironically, the Gutierrez court’s reference to Martinez appears to 
be inaccurate, as the defendant in that case was nearly eighteen years old at the time of his 
questioning. 979 P.2d at 724. Similarly, the referenced statement in Jonathan M. was dictum, 
as the court in that case held that the defendant’s statement was inadmissible. 791 P.2d at 66. 
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To offer just a couple examples,118 in State v. Goodwin119 the Supreme 
Court of Nebraska considered the second-degree murder conviction of 
Jordan M. Goodwin, who admitted at fourteen years old to firing shots that 
killed a six-year-old girl.120  The trial court denied Goodwin’s motion to 
suppress his confession as involuntary, and the Supreme Court of Nebraska 
affirmed.121  In holding that Goodwin’s confession was voluntary, the court 
considered both the voluntariness of Goodwin’s waiver of his Miranda rights 
and the voluntariness of his confession.122  It quoted the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s admonitions in Gault that “admissions and confessions of juveniles 
require special caution,”123 and that “the greatest care must be taken to assure 
that the admission was voluntary,”124 although it rejected Goodwin’s request 
for the imposition of a per se bar that would have prevented juveniles from 
waiving their Miranda rights without a lawyer.125 
When it came to actually evaluating the voluntariness of Goodwin’s 
waiver and confession, however, the court made no reference to the fact of 
Goodwin’s age or to the role that Goodwin’s age played in the court’s 
analysis.126  Instead, the court reasoned—as it would have in any adult 
confession case—that Goodwin had voluntarily waived his Miranda rights 
because he had been read those rights, had acknowledged that he understood 
them, and had failed to state unambiguously that he wished to speak to an 
attorney.127  The court also concluded that Goodwin’s confession itself was 
 
 118 For additional examples, see, e.g., Quick v. State, 599 P.2d 712, 719–20 (Alaska 1979); 
In re Joseph H., 188 Cal. Rptr. 3d 171, 185–87 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015); People v. Thorpe, 641 
P.2d 935, 941–42 (Colo. 1982); Harris v. State, 979 So. 2d 372, 375–77 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2008); J.P. v. State, 895 So. 2d 1202, 1203–04 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005); Swain v. State, 647 
S.E.2d 88, 91–92 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007); People v. Baker, 28 N.E.3d 836, 851–53 (Ill. App. Ct. 
2015); People v. Jenkins, 776 N.E.2d 755, 759–60 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002); People v. Golden, 753 
N.E.2d 475, 482–83 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001); State v. Ramos, 24 P.3d 95, 98–100 (Kan. 2001); 
People v. Walker, No. 284233, 2008 WL 4724265, at *1–3 (Mich. Ct. App. Oct. 28, 2008); 
In re SLL, 631 N.W.2d 775, 778–79 (Mich. Ct. App. 2001); In re Kenneth S., No. A-01-350, 
2002 WL 337760, at *3–5 (Neb. Ct. App. Mar. 5, 2002); State ex rel. A.W., 51 A.3d 793, 
806–07 (N.J. 2012); In re M.B., No. 22537, 2005 WL 2995113, at *3–4 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 
9, 2005); State v. Atkins, No. W2001–02427–CCA–R3–CD, 2003 WL 21339263, at *2–3 
(Tenn. Crim. App. May 16, 2003); Robinson v. Commonwealth, 756 S.E.2d 924, 928–30 (Va. 
Ct. App. 2014). 
 119 774 N.W.2d 733 (Neb. 2009).  
 120 Id. at 737. 
 121 Id. at 742–46. 
 122 Id. 
 123 Id. at 743 (quoting In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 45 (1967)). 
 124 Id. (quoting Gault, 387 U.S. at 55). 
 125 See id. at 743–44; see also infra note 161 and accompanying text. 
 126 See Goodwin, 774 N.W.2d at 744–46. 
 127 See id. 
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voluntary, even though the interrogating officers employed textbook 
minimization tactics,128 because the officers made no promises of leniency to 
Goodwin.129 
In a similar case, People v. Jones,130 the California Court of Appeal 
reviewed the murder and attempted murder convictions of Tramel Ray Jones, 
who was sentenced to eighty years to life in prison, based in part on a 
confession he gave when he was sixteen.131  The trial court denied Jones’s 
motion to suppress the confession, despite the fact that the interrogating 
officer relied heavily on deception tactics.132  For example, the officer 
showed Jones false lineups with his picture circled and falsely told Jones that 
the ballistics from the crime scene matched a gun found in Jones’s father’s 
home.133  The officer also falsely told Jones that his fingerprints were found 
on the gun, and he misleadingly suggested that Jones’s father might be 
charged with the crimes if Jones remained silent.134  Finally, the officer told 
Jones that he would only “do a little time in [a juvenile] camp” if he 
confessed.135 
In reciting the applicable legal standard governing Jones’s voluntariness 
arguments, the Court of Appeal acknowledged that “courts must use special 
care in scrutinizing the record to evaluate a claim that a juvenile’s custodial 
confession was not voluntarily given.”136  It nevertheless reasoned, as the 
Goodwin court did, that Jones’s Miranda waiver was voluntary, because he 
was advised of his rights, said that he understood those rights, and implicitly 
waived his rights by answering the officer’s questions.137  Similarly, when 
evaluating the voluntariness of Jones’s subsequent confession, the court 
made no mention of Jones’s age,138 and it dispensed with his objections to 
the interrogating officer’s tactics in the same way that it would have if Jones 
 
 128 See id. at 745. For example, “[b]oth officers characterized the event as a ‘tragic 
accident,’” and one of the officers stated that “[n]o one means to kill an innocent kid.” Id. The 
other officer further speculated that “there was a ‘good chance’ that the shooter did not know 
there was a child in the car and that he did not intend to kill her.” Id.; see also infra Section 
III.B. 
 129 See Goodwin, 774 N.W.2d at 745–46. 
 130 213 Cal. Rptr. 3d 167 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017), review denied, No. S240364, 2017 LEXIS 
3951, at *1 (Cal. May 10, 2017). 
 131 Id. at 171. 
 132 Id. at 184. 
 133 Id. 
 134 Id. at 183–84. 
 135 Id. at 183. 
 136 Id. at 185 (citation omitted). 
 137 Id. at 186–87. 
 138 Id. at 187–89. 
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had been an adult.  Namely, the court explained that “the use of deceptive 
comments does not necessarily render a statement involuntary,”139 and it 
cited prior cases—none of which involved juveniles—in which the Supreme 
Court of California had permitted the use of deceptive interrogation tactics.140 
C. THE STRAW MAN OF PER SE INADMISSIBILITY 
A final way in which courts misapply the special care standard is by 
misconstruing arguments in favor of heightened scrutiny as arguments in 
favor of a per se bar against the admissibility of juvenile confessions.  With 
the arguments so construed, courts readily dismiss them, as Supreme Court 
precedent makes clear that juvenile confessions are admissible under at least 
some circumstances.141 
Examples are again helpful.142  In State in Interest of P.G.,143 the Court 
of Appeals of Utah reviewed a seventeen-year-old defendant’s delinquency 
adjudication for aggravated sexual abuse of a child.144  P.G. was arrested after 
his five-year-old sister alleged that he had sexually abused her.145  He then 
confessed during an interrogation in which “the detective repeatedly told 
P.G. that he already knew that P.G. sexually assaulted” his sister, and in 
which the detective “refused to accept P.G.’s denials, and . . . shouted once 
at P.G. to ‘stop lying.’”146  P.G.’s motion to suppress his confession was 
denied, and he argued on appeal that the lower court’s voluntariness analysis 
 
 139 Id. at 188 (citation omitted). 
 140 See id. at 188–89 (citing People v. Williams, 233 P.3d 1000, 1029–30 (Cal. 2010); 
People v. Richardson, 183 P.3d 1146, 1168 (Cal. 2008), modified (July 16, 2008); People v. 
Farnam, 47 P.3d 988, 1042 (Cal. 2002), modified (July 31, 2002)). 
 141 See, e.g., Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 727 (1979). 
 142 For other examples, see, e.g., United States v. Juvenile Male, 968 F. Supp. 2d 490, 511 
(E.D.N.Y. 2013); Vance v. Bordenkircher, 505 F. Supp. 135, 138 (N.D.W. Va. 1981), aff’d, 
692 F.2d 978 (4th Cir. 1982); Ingram v. State, 918 S.W.2d 724, 728 (Ark. Ct. App. 1996); In 
re Jessie L., 182 Cal. Rptr. 396, 404 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982); Marshall v. State, 282 S.E.2d 301, 
303 (Ga. 1981); State v. Terrick, 857 So. 2d 1153, 1160–61 (La. Ct. App. 2003), writ denied, 
871 So. 2d 346 (La. 2004); State v. Hance, 233 A.2d 326, 330 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1967); 
Woodham v. State, 779 So. 2d 158, 161 (Miss. 2001); State v. Harris, 781 S.W.2d 137, 143 
(Mo. Ct. App. 1989); State v. Garner, 614 N.W.2d 319, 327 (Neb. 2000); People v. De Flumer, 
251 N.Y.S.2d 814, 817 (N.Y. App. Div. 1964), aff’d, 209 N.E.2d 93 (N.Y. 1965); State v. 
McKinney, 570 S.E.2d 238, 243 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002); In re Mellott, 217 S.E.2d 745, 746–47 
(N.C. Ct. App. 1975); State v. Smith, No. C-75588, 1977 WL 199638, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. 
Feb. 16, 1977); State v. Pittman, 647 S.E.2d 144, 164–66 (S.C. 2007); R.G. v. State, 416 P.3d 
478, 484 (Utah 2017); State v. Unga, 196 P.3d 645, 652 (Wash. 2008). 
 143 343 P.3d 297 (Utah Ct. App. 2015). 
 144 Id. at 300. 
 145 Id. at 299. 
 146 Id. at 301–02; see infra Section III.B (discussing maximization techniques); Section 
III.D (discussing leading questions). 
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had failed to assign appropriate weight to P.G.’s age, among other factors.147  
Instead of evaluating whether P.G.’s age made him vulnerable to the 
detective’s concededly “aggressive” techniques,148 however, the Court of 
Appeals rejected P.G.’s challenge on the simple grounds that “P.G.’s age 
does not render his confession involuntary”149—a per se argument that P.G. 
never advanced. The court then noted in two brief sentences that P.G. was 
nearly eighteen years old at the time of his confession and that “the Utah 
Supreme Court has found juveniles younger than P.G. to have voluntarily 
confessed,” before concluding that P.G.’s confession was not clearly 
involuntary.150 
Similarly, in State v. Fisher,151 the Court of Appeal of Louisiana 
affirmed a lower court judgment denying the suppression of a sixteen-year-
old defendant’s confession to armed robbery.152  In reviewing the defendant’s 
challenge to the voluntariness of his confession, the court recited the relevant 
legal standards—including that the evaluation of a juvenile confession 
should be conducted “under the totality of the circumstances standard 
applicable to adults, supplemented by consideration of other very significant 
factors relevant to the juvenile status of the accused”153—before briefly 
reviewing the defendant’s interrogation.  The court noted that the defendant’s 
mother was present, that both of them were advised of and waived their 
rights, that the defendant said he understood his rights, and that the defendant 
affirmed that “no promises, threats, or pressure [were] used against him.”154  
The court concluded based on this cursory analysis that the defendant’s 
confession was voluntary; it rejected the suggestion that the defendant’s age 
weighed against admission of his confession, writing that “there is no federal 
or state constitutional basis for invalidating an otherwise valid confession 
simply because the defendant has not quite reached the age of 17 and 
achieved non-juvenile status.”155 
III. DEFINING SPECIAL CARE 
As the foregoing cases make clear, lower courts regularly fail to apply 
special care when evaluating juvenile confessions.  This failure may owe in 
 
 147 P.G., 343 P.3d at 301. 
 148 Id. 
 149 Id. at 302. 
 150 Id. 
 151 87 So. 3d 189 (La. Ct. App. 2012). 
 152 Id. at 196. 
 153 Id. at 195 (quoting State v. Fernandez, 712 So. 2d 485, 489 (La. 1998)). 
 154 Id. 
 155 Id. at 196. 
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part to basic oversight by the courts, but it is also attributable to the malleable 
nature of the special care standard itself.156  When compounded with the fact 
that the Supreme Court has not decided a juvenile voluntariness case in 
decades,157 this malleability has allowed courts to stray from the principles 
first announced in Haley, Gallegos, and Gault.158  In order to tether courts 
more closely to these principles, this Part tries to define special care by 
delineating the factors that courts should consider when evaluating juvenile 
confessions. 
In defining special care, this Part does not advance proposals that would 
create new procedural protections for juveniles or that would expand existing 
ones.  This Part does not propose, for example, that all juvenile interrogations 
be recorded,159 that the provision of counsel be mandatory in juvenile 
interrogations,160 or that courts adopt other per se rules whose violation 
would trigger the exclusion of juvenile confessions.161  While such proposals 
are certainly worth considering, they have been defended at length in the 
existing literature, and their adoption would likely require innovation by 
legislatures and courts. 
Instead, this Part offers guidance on the proper application of current 
Supreme Court precedent.  Specifically, this Part maintains that special care 
 
 156 See Yekaterina Berkovich, Note, Ensuring Protection of Juveniles’ Rights: A Better 
Way of Obtaining a Voluntary Miranda Waiver, 88 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 561, 577–81 (2014); 
Drizin, The Lee Arthur Hester Case, supra note 93. 
 157 Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 (1979). Although the Court reaffirmed the special 
care requirement in J.D.B., it did not rule on the voluntariness of the defendant’s confession 
in that case. See J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 268 n.3 (2011). 
 158 See supra Section I.B. 
 159 See, e.g., Tamar R. Birckhead, The Age of the Child: Interrogating Juveniles After 
Roper v. Simmons, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 385, 444 (2008); Steven A. Drizin & Beth A. 
Colgan, Let the Cameras Roll: Mandatory Videotaping of Interrogations Is the Solution to 
Illinois’ Problem of False Confessions, 32 LOY. U. CHI. L. J. 337, 340 (2001); Lawrence 
Schlam, Police Interrogation of Children and State Constitutions: Why Not Videotape the 
MTV Generation?, 26 U. TOL. L. REV. 901, 902–03 (1995); Christine S. Scott-Hayward, 
Explaining Juvenile False Confessions: Adolescent Development and Police Interrogation, 31 
L. & PSYCHOL. REV. 53, 73 (2007). 
 160 See, e.g., PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON LAW ENF’T & ADMIN. OF JUST., THE CHALLENGE OF 
CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 87 (1967), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/42.pdf 
[perma.cc/KPU4-MGXZ]; Donna M. Bishop & Hillary B. Farber, Joining the Legal 
Significance of Adolescent Developmental Capacities with the Legal Rights Provided by In re 
Gault, 60 RUTGERS L. REV. 125, 149 (2007); Guggenheim & Hertz, supra note 38, at 170. 
 161 See, e.g., Michael Wayne Brooks, Comment, Kids Waiving Goodbye to Their Rights: 
An Argument Against Juveniles’ Ability to Waive Their Right to Remain Silent During Police 
Interrogations, 13 GEO. MASON L. REV. 219, 245 (2004); David T. Huang, Note, “Less 
Unequal Footing”: State Courts’ Per Se Rules for Juvenile Waivers During Interrogations 
and the Case for Their Implementation, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 437, 438 (2001). 
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requires courts to evaluate whether interrogators have used tactics that are 
disproportionately coercive when applied to juveniles.  Special care, after all, 
is nothing more than a recognition of juveniles’ heightened susceptibility to 
the pressures of interrogation.  It stands to reason that courts should focus on 
those pressures that are known to exacerbate juveniles’ unique 
vulnerabilities. 
When reading the discussion below, it is important to note that the list 
of tactics is not exhaustive.  Although this Part aims to highlight those 
methods that are most concerning when used in juvenile interrogations, there 
are almost certainly additional factors that courts should consider when 
applying special care.  Furthermore, this Part does not suggest that the use of 
the tactics below should result in the automatic invalidation of juvenile 
confessions, as courts must always engage in a subjective inquiry about 
whether interrogation techniques were coercive “as applied to the unique 
characteristics of a particular suspect.”162  These tactics should nevertheless 
be considered, and they should weigh against the conclusion in any given 
case that a juvenile’s confession was voluntary.  The more of these tactics 
that were used, the greater the weight should be. 
A. ISOLATION 
The first factor that courts should consider is the isolation of juvenile 
suspects from attorneys, parents, or other interested adults.  This section 
mentions the factor only briefly, as its inclusion in the special care analysis 
(when that analysis is applied) is already commonplace.  The Supreme Court 
put particular weight on isolation in both Haley163 and Gallegos,164 and lower 
courts and legislatures have emphasized that the absence of a friendly adult 
weighs heavily against the admission of a juvenile’s confession.165 
 
 162 Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 109 (1985). 
 163 Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 599–600 (1948) (plurality opinion) (“[A] lad of tender 
years . . . needs counsel and support if he is not to become the victim first of fear, then of 
panic. He needs someone on whom to lean lest the overpowering presence of the law, as he 
knows it, crush him.”). 
 164 Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 54 (1962) (“A lawyer or an adult relative or friend 
could have given the petitioner the protection which his own immaturity could not . . . . 
Without some adult protection against this inequality, a 14-year-old boy would not be able to 
know, let alone assert, such constitutional rights as he had.”). 
 165 See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-2-14(E)(8) (West 2009) (“In determining whether 
the child knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waived the child’s rights, the court shall 
consider . . . whether the respondent had the counsel of an attorney, friends or relatives at the 
time of being questioned.”); Grogg v. Com., 371 S.E.2d 549, 557 (Va. Ct. App. 1988) (“The 
absence of a parent or counsel is ‘a circumstance that weigh[s] against the admissibility of the 
confession.’” (quoting Miller v. Maryland, 577 F.2d 1158, 1159 (4th Cir. 1978))). 
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The fact that isolation from friendly adults puts disproportionate 
pressure on juveniles is intuitive, and it is supported generally by the research 
discussed in Section I.C. regarding youths’ immaturity and heighted 
susceptibility to outside pressures.166  Courts should note, however, that 
children will not always be helped by the presence of an untrained advocate, 
as studies suggest that “these adults, often passive, frequently urge their 
youths to cooperate with police.”167  As a result, courts should place 
particular weight on isolation from attorneys and other professional 
advocates, whose absence should militate unequivocally against the 
admission of a juvenile confession.168 
B. MAXIMIZATION AND MINIMIZATION 
In addition to isolation, two of the most commonly used classes of 
interrogation techniques are those involving “maximization” and 
“minimization.”169  The former refers to a category of “‘hard-sell’ 
technique[s] in which the interrogator tries to scare and intimidate the suspect 
into confessing by making false claims about evidence (e.g., staging an 
eyewitness identification or a fraudulent lie-detector test) and exaggerating 
the seriousness of the offense and the magnitude of the charges.”170  The latter 
describes “‘soft-sell’ technique[s] in which the police interrogator tries to lull 
the suspect into a false sense of security by offering sympathy, tolerance, 
face-saving excuses, and even moral justification, by blaming a victim or 
accomplice, by citing extenuating circumstances, or by playing down the 
seriousness of the charges.”171  Together, interrogators use these kinds of 
 
 166 See supra notes 81–83 and accompanying text. 
 167 Saul M. Kassin et al., Police-Induced Confessions: Risk Factors and 
Recommendations, 34 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 3, 30 (2010); see Grisso & Pomicter, supra note 79, 
at 340 (finding “that the presence of parents does not mitigate the coercive circumstances 
[inherent in police interrogation of juveniles] and that parents are unlikely to urge juveniles to 
assert their rights against self-incrimination”); Thomas Grisso & Melissa Ring, Parents’ 
Attitudes Toward Juveniles’ Rights in Interrogation, 6 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 211, 218 (1979) 
(finding that “50%-60% of the parents [surveyed] believed that juveniles should not be 
allowed to withhold information from police or courts when they are suspected of a crime”). 
 168 GISLI H. GUDJONSSON, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERROGATIONS AND CONFESSIONS: A 
HANDBOOK 262 (2003); Kassin et al., supra note 167, at 30; King, supra note 95, at 475. 
 169 Saul M. Kassin & Karlyn McNall, Police Interrogations and Confessions: 
Communicating Promises and Threats by Pragmatic Implication, 15 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 233, 
234–35 (1991); see Barry C. Feld, Real Interrogation: What Actually Happens When Cops 
Question Kids, 47 L. & SOC’Y REV. 1, 5 (2013). 
 170 Kassin & McNall, supra note 169, at 234–35. 
 171 Id. at 235. 
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tactics “to manipulate a suspect into thinking that it is in his or her best 
interest to confess.”172 
Although empirical studies have suggested that maximization and 
minimization techniques give rise to false confessions for suspects of all 
ages,173 the Supreme Court has generally allowed these techniques in cases 
involving adults.174  With juveniles, however, these tactics carry unique risks. 
Not only do maximization techniques play on juveniles’ unique 
susceptibilities, but the use of false evidence of guilt is also “especially 
convincing to youth, who are very susceptible to influence exerted by 
authority figures and may be reluctant to correct misinformation presented 
by such figures.”175  Likewise, minimization techniques have a greater 
influence on juveniles than they do on adults, as juveniles more often “lack 
the requisite capacity and savviness to resist subtle pressures exerted through 
a minimization narrative.”176  Minimization techniques are also “tailored by 
police to be especially persuasive to children and adolescents, creating 
narratives more likely to be compelling to youth.”177 
Given the disproportionate effect that maximization and minimization 
strategies have on children, courts should consider them carefully when 
evaluating juvenile confessions.  Courts should be particularly vigilant with 
respect to minimization techniques, as these techniques “generally involve[] 
a gentle, friendly approach in which the interrogator attempts to gain the 
suspect’s trust.”178  As a result, minimization tactics might look benign, or 
even preferable, when applied to juveniles, when in fact they are especially 
pernicious. 
 
 172 Kassin et al., supra note 167, at 12. 
 173 See Allyson J. Horgan et al., Minimization and Maximization Techniques: Assessing 
the Perceived Consequences of Confessing and Confession Diagnosticity, 18 PSYCHOL., 
CRIME & L. 65, 66 (2012); Kassin & McNall, supra note 169, at 248. 
 174 Kassin et al., supra note 167, at 12. 
 175 Naomi E. S. Goldstein et al., Waving Good-Bye to Waiver: A Developmental Argument 
Against Youths’ Waiver of Miranda Rights, 21 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 40 (2018) 
(citing Owen-Kostelnik et al., supra note 80, at 295). 
 176 Owen-Kostelnik et al., supra note 80, at 295 (“As adolescents are frequently more 
susceptible to authority figures, they may also be more open than adults to the rationale that 
detectives express through the minimization process. Moreover, adolescents’ truncated future 
orientation and risk perception/appreciation could make . . . the minimized ‘themes’ that much 
more tempting to endorse.”). 
 177 Goldstein et al., supra note 175, at 41 (citing Barry C. Feld, Behind Closed Doors: 
What Really Happens When Cops Question Kids, 23 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 395, 438–
40 (2013)). 
 178 Horgan et al., supra note 173, at 66. 
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C. DECEPTION 
As discussed above, maximization and minimization strategies often 
rely on the use of deception in order to pressure suspects into confessing. 
Deception tactics warrant a broader discussion of their own, however, as they 
are not coextensive with maximization and minimization,179 and they are 
both commonplace and particularly likely to be coercive when applied to 
juveniles. 
As a general matter, the Supreme Court has sanctioned deception in 
police interrogation of adults,180 even though deceptive tactics can lead to 
false confessions.181  As with maximization and minimization, however, 
deception raises unique concerns in the context of juvenile interrogations.182 
Where interrogators present suspects with false evidence of guilt, for 
example, juveniles are made particularly vulnerable by their “reliance on gut 
instincts and emotional impulses . . . because such tactics force suspects 
either to confess or rationally to rebut the alleged proof against them.”183 
Juveniles are also more suggestible than adults, and “when placed in high 
pressure interrogations, . . . are much more likely to change their stories and 
even to confess to crimes they did not commit.”184 
Juveniles’ susceptibility to false evidence has been studied in the 
laboratory setting, with striking results.  In one of the better-known 
experiments on the topic, researchers instructed subjects to type letters on a 
computer keyboard, but not to touch the ALT key, as doing so would cause 
the computer to crash.185  The researchers then caused the computer to crash 
during the typing exercise, and they asked the (factually innocent) subjects 
 
 179 For example, if a police officer obtains a confession by posing as a suspect’s cellmate, 
see, e.g., Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 294 (1990), then he will have deceived the suspect, 
even if he does not attempt to exaggerate or downplay the suspect’s culpability. 
 180 See, e.g., Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495–96 (1977) (per curiam) (reversing 
state supreme court decision that confession should be suppressed where suspect was falsely 
told that his fingerprints were found at the crime scene); Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 737–
39 (1969) (upholding admission of confession where suspect was falsely told that his cousin 
had confessed). 
 181 Irina Khasin, Note, Honesty Is the Best Policy: A Case for the Limitation of Deceptive 
Police Interrogation Practices in the United States, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1029, 1033 
(2009). 
 182 See generally Patrick M. McMullen, Comment, Questioning the Questions: The 
Impermissibility of Police Deception in Interrogations of Juveniles, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 971 
(2005). 
 183 Id. at 996. 
 184 Id. at 998 (citing G. Richardson et al., Interrogative Suggestibility in an Adolescent 
Forensic Population, 18 J. ADOLESCENCE 211, 211–16 (1995)). 
 185 Allison D. Redlich & Gail S. Goodman, Taking Responsibility for an Act Not 
Committed: The Influence of Age and Suggestibility, 27 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 141, 146 (2003). 
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to sign a statement admitting to hitting the ALT key.186  Some subjects were 
presented with a false printout indicating that they had hit the ALT key, and, 
of those subjects, juveniles were significantly more likely than young adults 
to sign the admission statement.187  Most notably, 88% of fifteen and sixteen-
year-olds presented with the false printout signed the statement admitting to 
hitting the ALT key.188 
Clearly, laboratory settings differ in important ways from interrogation 
rooms, but they nevertheless provide support for the proposition that 
juveniles are disproportionately susceptible to deception.  In addition to the 
presentation of false evidence, interrogators use deception to operate on 
juveniles’ susceptibility by falsely downplaying suspects’ culpability.189  
While subtle, this form of deception has been found to communicate 
expectations of lenient sentencing “as effectively as . . . an explicit promise” 
of leniency.190  The Supreme Court has held that promises of leniency can 
render even an adult confession involuntary,191 and courts must be 
particularly vigilant when such promises are not only made to juveniles, but 
also implied through the false downplaying of juveniles’ culpability.  For 
example, where interrogators (falsely) tell a juvenile suspect that “everything 
[i]s going to be O.K.,”192 that his role in the crime “was not his fault,”193 and 
that his actions “were completely ‘understandable,’”194 courts should be 
hesitant in concluding that any subsequent confession was voluntarily given.  
Although such tactics may be permissible when used with adults, they are 
disproportionately likely to cause juveniles to “confess merely as a way to 
escape the isolation and anxiety that permeates the interrogation room.”195 
 
 186 Id. 
 187 Id. at 148. 
 188 Id. 
 189 See Feld, supra note 169, at 13; Feld, supra note 6, at 277–84, 277 tbl.4; Goldstein et 
al., supra note 175, at 41–42; Owen-Kostelnik et al., supra note 80, at 295; Ariel Spierer, 
Note, The Right to Remain a Child: The Impermissibility of the Reid Technique in Juvenile 
Interrogations, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1720, 1728 (2017). 
 190 Kassin & McNall, supra note 169, at 241. 
 191 See Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528, 534 (1963); Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556, 560–
61 (1954). 
 192 J.G. v. State, 883 So. 2d 915, 926 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004). 
 193 Dassey v. Dittmann, 201 F. Supp. 3d 963, 983 (E.D. Wis. 2016) (subsequent history 
omitted). 
 194 In re Elias V., 188 Cal. Rptr. 3d 202, 215 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015), modified (June 24, 
2015). 
 195 Spierer, supra note 189, at 1728 (citing Feld, supra note 6, at 243–44). 
40 GIFFORD [Vol. 110 
D. LEADING AND FACT-FEEDING 
Even where interrogators refrain from using deception, they may 
unintentionally coerce juveniles through the use of leading questions and 
fact-feeding.  In any interrogation, these tactics make for bad practice, as they 
risk contaminating the suspect’s confession, thereby undermining law 
enforcement’s confidence that obtained information truly originated with the 
suspect.  For this reason, “[p]olice have long been trained not to contaminate 
a confession by feeding or leaking crucial facts,”196 and interrogation training 
manuals have made clear that “[l]eading questions are not to be asked, at least 
not as to crucial corroborated details concerning the crime.”197 
When applied to juveniles, leading questions and fact-feeding are even 
more dangerous.  Research has shown that juveniles are more likely to adopt 
false narratives when subjected to repeated questioning and other forms of 
pressure.198  And juveniles are particularly susceptible to such pressures 
when the individual questioning them is an adult.199  Moreover, when leading 
questions are repeated, juveniles “may assume they gave the ‘wrong’ answer 
the first time, and feel pressure to provide the ‘right’ answer.”200  As a result, 
when it comes to minors, some research suggests that “leading questions 
based on the actual evidence . . . are as likely as fraudulent tactics to cause a 
false confession.”201 
Juveniles’ susceptibility to leading questions and fact-feeding has been 
demonstrated in numerous high-profile false confession cases in which 
suspects were alleged to know facts that were available only to the 
perpetrator and the police.  In the case of Jeffrey Deskovic,202 for example, a 
sixteen-year-old boy was arrested for the rape and murder of his classmate, 
based on accurate diagrams that he drew of the crime scene and other 
 
 196 Brandon L. Garrett, The Substance of False Confessions, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1051, 1066 
(2010). 
 197 Id. at 1067; see FRED E. INBAU ET AL., CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 
315 (5th ed. 2013); see also Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 322 (1959) (holding confession 
involuntary where suspect, among other things, “did not make a narrative statement, but was 
subject to the leading questions of a skillful prosecutor in a question and answer confession”). 
 198 Saul M. Kassin & Gisli H. Gudjonsson, The Psychology of Confessions: A Review of 
the Literature and Issues, 5 PSYCHOL. SCI. PUB. INT. 33, 52 (2004). 
 199 DAVID E. ZULAWSKI & DOUGLAS E. WICKLANDER, PRACTICAL ASPECTS OF INTERVIEW 
AND INTERROGATION 82 (2d ed. 2002). 
 200 John E.B. Myers et al., Psychological Research on Children as Witnesses: Practical 
Implications for Forensic Interviews and Courtroom Testimony, 28 PAC. L.J. 3, 23 (1996). 
 201 Christopher Slobogin, Lying and Confessing, 39 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1275, 1291 (2007). 
 202 See generally LESLIE CROCKER SNYDER ET AL., REPORT ON THE CONVICTION OF JEFFREY 
DESKOVIC (June 2007), http://www.westchesterda.net/Jeffrey%20Deskovic%20Comm%
20Rpt.pdf [perma.cc/WAH8-JRT7]. 
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information he provided “about the crime that only the killer would know,” 
such as the existence of a handwritten note that was found with the victim’s 
body.203  Even though Deskovic was excluded at the outset of the 
investigation as the source of DNA found at the crime scene, he was 
nevertheless tried and convicted, and he spent sixteen years in prison before 
the DNA was matched to another man who confessed to the crime.204 
A postmortem of the conviction prepared at the request of the district 
attorney’s office concluded that there were two possible ways in which 
Deskovic could have obtained his inside information: “either the police 
(deliberately or inadvertently) communicated this information directly to 
Deskovic or their questioning at the high school and elsewhere caused this 
supposedly secret information to be widely known throughout the 
community.”205  While we cannot prove which of these possibilities occurred, 
“[g]iven the level of specificity reportedly provided by Deskovic, the second 
and more troubling possibility, that the officers disclosed facts to him, seems 
far more likely.”206 
Even more disturbing than the Deskovic case is the story of Ryan Harris. 
Harris was an eleven-year-old girl who was raped and murdered in 1998.207  
Not long after her body was found, two boys, one seven and one eight, were 
charged with “striking [Harris] with a rock, sexually molesting her and 
suffocating her with her own underwear.”208  After being questioned by the 
police, the two boys “independently described how they knocked the girl off 
her bike, hit her in the head with a brick, dragged her into weeds, and sexually 
molested her, leaving her to die—facts that matched the crime.”209  While the 
police initially maintained that “the boys gave statements that contained 
details of the crime that only the true killers would have known,” the 
prosecution dropped the charges against the boys after semen was found on 
Harris’s underpants, and a perfect DNA match was later made with a man 
who had previously been charged with sexually assaulting young girls.210  To 
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 207 Lisa M. Krzewinski, Note, But I Didn’t Do It: Protecting the Rights of Juveniles 
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the extent that the boys did in fact provide details that “only the true killers 
would have known,” these details were almost certainly fed to them (whether 
intentionally or unintentionally) by the interrogating officers. 
*** 
The interrogation tactics discussed in this Part—isolation, maximization 
and minimization, deception, and leading and fact-feeding—present unique 
risks when applied to juvenile suspects.  Each one plays on a range of 
vulnerabilities that are common in children, but that are not present, or are 
present only to a lesser extent, in adults.  Given the Supreme Court’s 
admonition that juveniles not “be judged by the more exacting standards of 
maturity,”211 review of these tactics is a natural starting point for courts 
conducting a special care analysis. 
Of course, courts should not automatically suppress a confession if 
some or all of the tactics discussed in this Part have been used.  And courts 
should make sure to consider arguments regarding other kinds of tactics that 
are not discussed here.  This Part nevertheless provides a framework for the 
proper application of the special care standard: where interrogators use 
tactics that are particularly coercive for juveniles, the use of these tactics 
should weigh against the admission of the confession. 
CONCLUSION 
For the better part of the last century, the Supreme Court has recognized 
that juvenile suspects are uniquely vulnerable to the pressures of police 
interrogation.  In order to mitigate the constitutional risks created by this 
vulnerability, the Court has consistently reaffirmed the importance of 
applying special care when evaluating juvenile confessions.  Unfortunately, 
lower courts have often failed to recognize the importance of this standard, 
and they have strayed from the principles first announced by the Court in 
Haley, Gallegos, and Gault.  At the same time, social science and false 
confession studies have confirmed the need for special care, and they have 
even made that need more pronounced. 
This Article does not purport to solve the problem of involuntary 
confessions or to provide an exhaustive accounting of the relevant case law 
or empirical literature.  Instead, it aims to highlight the importance of the 
special care requirement and to provide guidance regarding its application.  
My hope is that litigants, judges, and other legal actors will use the discussion 
above to frame their analyses and ensure that juvenile confessions receive the 
special care that they demand. 
 
 211 Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 599 (1948) (plurality opinion). 
